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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-3625
________________
MICHAEL VIGGIANO,
                    Appellant
       v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS; CHARLES MORRIS; STEVEN PARKELL; 
GEORGE BLASKEWICZ
_______________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 99-cv-02630)
District Judge: William J. Martini
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 31, 2005
Before:      Alito, McKee and Ambro, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  June 23, 2005)
____________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Michael Viggiano appeals pro se the order of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment to the State of New Jersey, the
2New Jersey Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Charles Morris, Steven Parkell, and
George Blaskewicz (collectively, “defendants”) in his employment discrimination action. 
Because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s order.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  
As we write for the parties, we need only review the pertinent facts and procedural
history of the underlying matter.  Viggiano was hired as a corrections officer by the DOC
in 1983.  In January 1997, Viggiano, along with seventeen other DOC employees, filed a
charge of national origin discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”).  The January 1997 charge alleged that the DOC discriminated
against Italian-Americans by using the term “WOP” as an acronym to describe “leave
without pay.”  The parties entered into a settlement agreement on May 20, 1997, which
provided, inter alia, that the DOC would remove the term “WOP” from its documents
and administrative system, not tolerate the use of the term in the workplace, and not
discriminate or retaliate against Viggiano because of the filing of the charge or his
national origin.  
In September 1997, Viggiano filed additional charges with the EEOC alleging
retaliation and national origin discrimination.  In February and September 1999, the
EEOC issued two determinations in which it found “reason to believe” that violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) had
occurred.
       A total of six officers were charged with undue familiarity with an inmate stemming1
from the SID’s investigation.  One other officer had been a party to the January 1997
EEOC charge.  The remaining four officers are African-American. 
       In the meantime, Viggiano and twenty-three other DOC employees filed a complaint2
in the District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that the DOC’s continued use
of the acronym “WOP” violated Title VII.  See Decibus, et al. v. State of New Jersey
Department of Corrections, et al., D. NJ. 00-cv-03261.  The plaintiffs subsequently
amended their complaint to allege that they were subjected to a hostile work environment
in violation of Title VII and the NJLAD.  In June 2001, the District Court dismissed the
amended complaint without prejudice, and the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied.  This Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal for failure to prosecute
in November 2003.  See C.A. No. 03-2981.
3
On June 8, 1999, Viggiano filed the underlying counseled complaint in the District
Court.  In his complaint, Viggiano alleged that the defendants retaliated against him in
violation of Title VII after he engaged in protected activity, and discriminated against him
because of his national origin in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq.  While his complaint was pending in the
District Court, the DOC Special Investigations Division (“SID”) concluded that Viggiano
had accepted and used the legal services of an inmate, George Riley, in violation of the
Law Enforcement Personnel Rules and Regulations.   As a result, Viggiano was1
terminated effective February 2, 2000. 
On August 18, 2004, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment in the underlying case.   Viggiano timely appealed.  Viggiano has2
been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and has filed a motion for appointment
of counsel.
4We exercise plenary review of an order granting summary judgment.  See McLeod
v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 618, 623 (3d Cir. 2004).  A grant of summary
judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c).  We view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was entered.  See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States
Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).  We may affirm the District Court on any
grounds supported by the record.  See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000)
(en banc).
To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse
employment action against him; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.  See Weston v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 251
F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d
Cir. 1997).  If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer must
come forward with a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment
action.  See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 & n. 2 (3d Cir. 1997).  If the
employer is able to meet this burden, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful retaliation.  See id.  Here, the District
Court concluded that Viggiano established a prima facie case of retaliation, but that he
       Viggiano, however, conceded at his deposition that, although he was being fitted for3
the vest at the time of his termination, he was never actually required to wear it.  Viggiano
Dep. at 124.
5
failed to show that the defendants’ proffered reasons for its actions were a pretext for
unlawful retaliation. 
Title VII prohibits action which would “deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”  42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  Retaliatory conduct other than discharge or refusal to hire is
proscribed by Title VII “only if it alters the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, deprives him . . . of employment opportunities, or adversely
affects his status as an employee.”  Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300 (internal quotations
omitted).  In short, not everything that makes an employee unhappy qualifies as
retaliation.  See id.
Viggiano alleged in the District Court that the defendants retaliated against him by:
verbally reprimanding him for wearing an improper belt; ordering him to wear a
protective vest which exacerbated a skin condition;  denying him time off for personal3
and medical reasons; verbally reprimanding him in front of other officers; disciplining
him for failing to call off duty; and terminating his employment.  Although the District
Court seemed to find otherwise, we conclude that Viggiano failed to establish how, with
the exception of his termination, these alleged “retaliatory” acts effected the terms or
conditions of his employment.  See Weston, 251 F.3d at 431; Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1301. 
6Viggiano has not alleged that he was demoted, had his work schedule changed, was
reassigned to a different position or location within the DOC, had his hours changed or
altered, or was denied a pay raise or promotion as a result of the defendants’ alleged
actions.  See Weston, 251 F.3d at 431.  We cannot, therefore, characterize these alleged
incidents as adverse employment actions.  As such, we will focus only on whether the
defendants retaliated against Viggiano when they terminated his employment in February
2000.
Assuming arguendo that Viggiano established a prima facie case of retaliation as
to his February 2000 termination, the District Court properly granted summary judgment
to the defendants on this claim.  The defendants asserted that they terminated Viggiano’s
employment because he engaged in unduly familiar activities with an inmate and they
introduced ample evidence in the District Court to support this assertion, including the
report and supplementary report detailing the SID’s investigation and Hearing Officer
Mary Wirth’s report sustaining Viggiano’s termination.  Moreover, for the reasons fully
discussed by the District Court, Viggiano failed to demonstrate that this reason was
actually a pretext for retaliation.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that to survive summary judgment a plaintiff must produce evidence which
either discredits an employer’s articulated reason or shows that retaliation was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action).   Thus, the District
Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on Viggiano’s
       It appears as though Viggiano may have attempted to allege in the District Court a4
claim of hostile work environment under the NJLAD based upon the DOC’s continued
use of the term “WOP.”  The District Court did not address this claim.  However, we note
that Viggiano, represented by counsel, failed to develop this claim either factually or
legally in the District Court.  See, e.g., Lehman v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 453-
54 (N.J. 1993) (it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that the complained-of conduct: (1)
would not have occurred but for the employee’s protected status, and was (2) severe or
pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of
employment have been altered and that the working environment is hostile or abusive).
7
retaliation claim.
Likewise, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the
defendants on Viggiano’s claim of national origin discrimination.   The NJLAD makes it4
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of his national
origin.  See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1(a).  In analyzing claims under the NJLAD, courts apply the
familiar burden-shifting framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See Erikson v. March & McLennan Co.,
Inc., 569 A.2d 793, 798-99 (N.J. 1990); Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Public Schools, 733
A.2d 571, 575-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 1999).  To set forth a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge under the NJLAD, it was incumbent upon Viggiano to show
that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position from
which he was discharged; and (3) others not in the protected class were treated more
favorably.  See McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.  Here, the District Court assumed that
Viggiano could establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination, but granted
the defendants summary judgment because he failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to
8whether their reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for
discrimination.  For the reasons already discussed herein and by the District Court, we
agree that Viggiano failed to show that the defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for his termination (i.e., an internal investigation conclusion of undue familiarity
with an inmate) was a pretext for discrimination.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District
Court.  Viggiano’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6
F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
